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Reprinted  from  The  Amebican  Political  Science  Review,  Yol.  XI,  No.  1,  February,  1917 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY1 

;(A-en 

ROBERT  W.  NEESER 
Secretary  of  the  Navai History  Society 


In  the  United  States,  the  department  of  the  navy  is  the  con- 
stituted organ  of  the  government  for  administering  the  navy. 
Its  sole  reason  for  existence  is  the  possibility  of  war.  The  most 
important  office  in  the  navy  department,  after  that  of  the  secre- 
tary of  the  navy,  is  the  office  of  naval  operations.  All  the  other 
offices  in  the  navy  are  merely  accessory  to  that  one  particular 
office  the  function  of  which  is  the  preparation  of  the  navy  for 
war. 

The  method  of  naval  administration  now  in  force  in  the 
United  States  is  the  outcome  of  a gradual  development.  When 
the  Constitution  went  into  effect  in  1789,  it  contained  several 
references  to  the  navy.  Congress  was  given  power  to  “ provide 
and  maintain  a navy.”  The  President  was  made  the  “com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  navy”  and  there  was  a clause  which  for- 
bade the  States  from  owning  ships  of  wa^r  in  time  of  peace. 
When,  during  Washington’s  administration,  the  executive  de- 
partments were  organized,  there  was  no  navy,  and  there  was  no 
pressing  need  for  one.  Congress,  therefore,  vested  the  control 
of  the  navy  in  the  secretary  of  war.  The  frigate  Constitution 
and  her  sister  ships  were  thus  built  under  the  direction  of  the 
war  department.  But  the  imminent  hostilities  with  France  in 
1798  revealed  the  need  of  a separate  executive  department  for 
the  proper  administration  of  our  sea  force,  and,  on  April  30, 
1798,  the  bill  creating  the  navy  department  became  a law. 

The  rich  experience  gained  in  the  war  of  1812  exposed  the 
fatuity  of  having  the  navy  administered  by  a civilian,  unaided 
by  responsible  professional  advisers,  or  even  the  means  of  carry- 


1 A paper  read  at  the  meeting  of  the  American  Political  Science  Association 
at  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  December  29,  1916. 

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THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


ing  on  the  duties  of  his  office.  The  act  of  February  7,  1815, 
was  therefore  passed,  which  created  the  board  of  navy  commis- 
•sioners,  consisting  of  three  post  captains,  the  highest  rank  of 
that  day.  This  board  was  attached  to  the  secretary’s  office  to 
discharge  under  his  superintendence  all  the  ministerial  duties 
of  the  office.  This  new  legislation  was  a step  in  the  right  di- 
rection. It  was  modeled  upon  the  excellent  naval  administra- 
tions created  for  the  British  navy  in  1688.  Unfortunately,  our 
legislators  took  only  part  of  the  system  to  which  they  had  turned 
for  enlightenment.  They  provided  an  executive  and  military 
branch  “for  the  employment  of  vessels  of  war,”  but  they  left 
out  the  civil  and  industrial  branch  which  has  to  do  with  the 
construction,  armament,  and  equipment  of  the  war  vessels,  and 
the  “procurement  of  naval  stores  and  materials.”  Herein  lay 
the  weakness  of  the  act  of  1815.  Its  purpose  besides  was  mis- 
understood from  the  first,  and  by  no  less  a person  than  the  sec- 
retary of  the  navy,  whose  hands  it  was  intended  to  strengthen. 
The  latter  insisted  that  the  duties  of  the  commissioners  were  of 
a civil  character,  and  this  false  conception  of  the  object  of  the 
navy  board  gave  rise  to  much  friction,  until  in  the  end  it  lead 
to  the  repeal  of  the  law. 

A remedy  for  the  defects  was  sought  in  the  act  of  August  31, 
1842,  which,  in  place  of  the  navy  board,  substituted  five  naval 
administrative  bureaus,  whose  names  were : bureau  of  yards  and 
docks;  bureau  of  construction,  equipment  and  repair;  bureau  of 
provisions  and  clothing;  bureau  of  ordnance  and  hydrography; 
bureau  of  medicine  and  surgery.  Subsequently  three  additional 
bureaus  of  navigation,  steam  engineering  and  equipment  were 
established. 

The  missing  left  arm  of  the  naval  organization  was  thus  sup- 
plied; but,  in  the  same  stroke  of  the  pen,  the  all  important  right 
arm  was  severed,  and  the  navy  was  left  without  a responsible 
direction  of  its  military  force.  In  addition  there  was  that 
pernicious  clause  which  provided  that  the  “orders  of  a chief  of 
bureau  shall  be  considered  as  emanating  from  the  secretary  of 
the  navy,  and  shall  have  full  force  and  effect  as  such.”  The 
act  thus  unintentionally  created,  in  practice,  no  less  than  half 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


61 


a dozen  secretaries  of  the  navy,  each  one,  in  his  own  bureau, 
clothed  with  executive  authority  equal  to  that  of  the  constitu- 
tional commander-in-chief.  This  was  a flagrant  violation  of  a 
fundamental  military  principle,  and  it  is  this  that  caused  such 
dire  confusion,  extravagance,  duplication  of  work  and  irrespon- 
sibility, which,  according  to  several  secretaries  of  the  navy,  have 
characterized  the  business  methods  of  the  navy  department  for 
the  last  sixty  years.  Moreover,  each  chief  of  bureau  was  so 
engaged  with  the  affairs  of  his  own  bureau  that  the  general  man- 
agement of  the  navy  and  its  employment  was  left  to  a civilian 
totally  unfamiliar  with  naval  affairs. 

During  the  first  few  months  of  the  civil  war  the  defects 
of  the  administrative  system  of  the  navy  department  attracted 
widespread  attention.  The  weakness  of  the  secretary’s  office 
as  a directing  and  unifying  force  was  remedied  in  part  by  the 
creation  of  the  office  of  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy.  This 
was  a step  in  the  right  direction  toward  correlating  the  work  of 
the  several  bureaus.  But  even  then  further  agencies  were 
necessary  to  assist  the  secretary  in  his  administration  of  what 
Lincoln  called  “ Uncle  Sam’s  web-feet.”  These  Secretary  Welles 
sought  in  the  “ commission  of  conference,”  created  to  discuss  and 
determine  the  necessary  naval  plans  and  operation,  and  in  a 
second  confidential  board  comprising  the  bureau  chiefs  for  the 
purpose  of  “considering  and  acting  upon  such  subjects  con- 
nected with  the  naval  service  as  may  be  submitted  to  them  by 
the  department.”  In  1863  a “permanent  commission”  was  ap- 
pointed to  report  on  all  questions  relating  to  science  upon  which 
professional  advice  was  needed.  During  the  war  various  other 
temporary  boards,  such  as  the  “ironclad  board,”  the  “harbor 
commission,”  and  the  “board  on  plans  and  designs  for  the  new 
vessels,”  were  also  created  as  circumstances  demanded. 

“The  very  great  success  of  the  navy  in  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion,” commented  Admiral  Mahan  in  one  of  his  graphic  studies 
of  our  naval  administration,  “is  universally  admitted  and  needs 
no  insistence;  but,  though  frequently  narrated  historically,  it 
is  doubtful  whether  it  is  yet  philosophically  appreciated,  or 
even  understood.  For  present  purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  note 


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the  fact  that  there  was  then  found  within  the  navy  department — 
nothing  existing  there  before,  but  introduced  fortuitously  for 
the  occasion — a means  by  which  the  enthusiastic  determination 
of  the  nation  could  take  shape  in  intelligent  comprehension  of 
the  issues  and  in  strongly  coordinate  effort;  while  to  the  satis- 
factory maintenance  of  the  activity  thus  directed  the  bureau 
system  was  found  adequate.77 

The  war  showed  the  merits  of  the  bureau  system  under  fa- 
vorable forcing  conditions.  But  peace  speedily  demonstrated  its 
defects.  The  moment  hostilities  came  to  a close,  the  princi- 
pal task  of  the  navy  department  became  the  reduction  of  the 
huge  establishment  which  had  been  developed  during  the  war. 
The  commission  of  conference  and  the  other  boards  were  dis- 
continued. Captain  Gustavus  V.  Fox,  who,  as  assistant  sec- 
retary of  the  navy,  had  supplied  the  place  of  the  “one  navy 
commissioner,77  which  had  been  urgently  recommended  when  the 
navy  department  was  reorganized  in  1842,  resigned,  and  with 
him  disappeared  what  had  been  virtually  an  institution,  rather 
than  an  individual  or  an  office.  Later  on,  the  law  authorizing 
an  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy  was  repealed.  “The  lesson  of 
the  civil  war  was  thrown  away/7  remarked  one  naval  authority, 
“and  the  department  relapsed  into  a state  looking  to  the  early 
advent  of  the  millenium,  when  wars  on  earth  shall  cease.77 

From  this  dream  of  uninterrupted  peace  the  country  was 
awakened  in  1873,  when  the  imminence  of  war  with  Spain,  in- 
cident upon  the  seizure  of  the  Virginius,  spurred  the  depart- 
ment to  the  consideration  of  military  questions.  That  part  of 
the  “business77  had  been  unfortunately  neglected  in  our  naval 
administration  since  1866.  But  nothing  resulted  from  the  war 
scare  and  another  lesson  was  lost  upon  us. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  there  was  any  concealment  of  this 
inability  of  the  navy  department  of  itself  to  deal  with  questions 
of  war.  In  1877  an  attempt  was  made  by  Secretary  Thomp- 
son to  unify  the  separate  parts  of  the  navy  department  by  form- 
ing a board  consisting  of  the  chiefs  of  the  several  bureaus,  but 
the  new  organization  effected  little,  for  the  centrifugal  forces 
of  the  department  were  too  much  for  it.  This  was  only  one 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


63 


of  the  several  attempts  made  during  the  period  1866-1881  to 
create  some  permanent  board  which  should  occupy  a position  in 
the  administrative  hierarchy  between  the  chiefs  of  bureaus  and 
the  secretary  of  the  navy,  and  thus  bring  to  an  end  a condition 
that  was  becoming  intolerable.  Secretary  William  C.  Whitney, 
in  his  annual  report  of  1885,  frankly  admitted  the  “ universal 
dissatisfaction”  with  the  inner  workings  of  the  navy  depart- 
ment: “It  is  expressed  to  me  quite  universally  by  the  naval 
officers,  coupled  with  the  hope  and  expectation  that  some  remedy 
may  be  found  and  speedily  applied.  The  country  has  expended 
since  July  1,  1868,  over  seventy-five  millions  of  money  on  the 
construction,  repair,  equipment,  and  ordnance  of  vessels,  which 
sum,  with  a very  slight  exception,  has  been  substantially  thrown 
away.”  “It  is  questionable,”  he  went  on  to  add,  “whether  we 
have  a single  naval  vessel  finished  and  afloat  at  the  present  time 
that  could  be  trusted  to  encounter  the  ships  of  any  important 
power.  This  is  no  secret;  the  fact  has  been  repeatedly  com- 
mented upon  in  congress,  confessed  by  our  highest  naval  authori- 
ties, and  deprecated  by  all.  It  is  idle  to  suppose  that  abuses 
of  the  character  I have  glanced  at  can  be  prevented  merely  by 
a change  in  the  personnel  of  the  department.  It  is  the  system 
which  is  vicious.”  And  he  cites  the  case  of  the  Omaha , upon 
which  four  separate  bureaus  had  been  working,  independently 
and  not  always  in  harmony,  in  producing  their  respective  parts 
of  the  completed  ship,  with  the  result  that  when  she  was  ready 
for  sea,  they  had  so  completely  appropriated  her  space  that 
they  had  left  barely  coal  room  for  four  days’  steaming. 

Such  a pitiless  disclosure  of  “mismanagement,  of  wasteful 
expenditure,  of  injudicious  and  ill-advised  disposition  of  pub- 
lic moneys,”  should  have  lead  to  immediate  and  salutary  re- 
forms. Secretary  Whitney  admitted  that  the  evils  could  not  be 
corrected  under  the  organization  of  the  department  then  exist- 
ing. Yet  nothing  came  of  it;  and  four  years  later  we  read  Sec- 
retary Tracy  voicing  a similar  complaint  that  the  entire  organi- 
zation of  the  department  was  “without  system  or  coherence.” 

When  the  war  with  Spain  broke  out,  the  navy  department, 
for  the  fourth  time,  found  itself  with  no  organization  for  the 


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strategic  control  of  its  fleets,  the  bureaus  being  fully  engrossed 
with  their  own  administrative  work.  Accordingly,  the  so-called 
naval  strategy  board  was  extemporized  to  study  the  strategic 
situation  and  to  offer  sound  military  advice  upon  current  affairs  to 
the  secretary  of  the  navy  and  to  the  President  as  constitutional 
commander-in-chief.  Fortunately,  the  strategy  board  had  at 
its  command  a plan  for  action  which  the  naval  war  college  had 
thoroughly  digested  a few  years  before.  This,  the  only  one  to 
which  careful  thought  had  been  given,  was  perforce  the  one 
which  Admiral  Sampson’s  fleet  and  General  Shatter’s  army 
followed. 

After  the  war,  the  strategy  board,  being  merely  a temporary 
organization,  lapsed,  and  the  navy  department  once  more  re- 
fused to  admit  that  it  had  duties  other  than  administrative. 
But  this  condition  could  not  continue  long.  In  1900  Captain 
Henry  C.  Taylor’s  views  on  the  “ concrete”  needs  of  the  navy 
department  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a general  board  for  the 
purpose  of  dealing  with  the  military  duties  of  the  department. 
“The  American  navy,”  he  wrote,  “has  for  some  years  felt  in- 
stinctively that  this,  or  something  like  this,  was  needed  for 
future  efficiency.  Evidence  of  this  is  apparent  in  the  creation, 
many  years  ago,  of  a war  college  at  Newport  and  an  office  of 
intelligence  in  the  navy  department.  In  those  two  institutions 
are  to  be  found  many  of  the  elements  of  a general  staff,  requir- 
ing only  a slight  drawing  together  by  a common  head  to  create 
a nucleus  of  effort  around  which  would  form  a body  of  great 
usefulness  to  the  navy  and  to  the  country.”  The  members  of 
the  general  board  were  the  admiral  of  the  navy,  the  chief  of  the 
bureau  of  navigation,  the  chief  intelligence  officer,  and  the 
president  of  the  naval  war  college.  Its  duties  were  to  ascertain 
the  demands  which  our  national  policies  were  likely  to  make 
on  the  navy,  and  to  advise  the  secretaries  of  the  measures  and 
the  plans  necessary  to  accomplish  the  navy’s  mission.  This 
involved  the  preparation  of  the  necessary  plans  for  war,  and  the 
coordinating  for  this  end  of  the  work  of  the  naval  war  college, 
which  did  the  strategic  and  tactical  thinking  for  the  navy,  and 
the  office  of  naval  intelligence,  which  gathered  the  data  for 
studies  of  the  mobilization  plans  of  other  nations. 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


65 


The  jealousies  and  fears  of  the  administrative  bureaus  for  a 
time  seriously  threatened  the  existence  of  the  general  board. 
But  the  prestige  which  the  newly  formed  body  owed  to  its 
president,  the  admiral  of  the  navy,  enabled  it  to  hold  its  own  and 
to  improve  its  early  position  as  the  military  branch  of  the  navy 
department.  Its  role,  however,  was  merely  that  of  an  advisory 
body  to  the  secretary  of  the  navy,  to  whom  it  addressed  all  its 
communications.  In  addition,  it  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that 
the  general  board  was  established  only  by  a general  order  (No. 
544,  dated  March  13,  1900)  issued  by  the  navy  department,  and 
that  it  never  received  legislative  recognition  by  congress  until 
1916. 

On  the  whole  the  organization  of  the,  navy  department  re- 
mained based  upon  its  former  plan.  The  several  bureaus  con- 
tinued to  exercise  the  same  duties  as  heretofore,  with  one  ex- 
ception. This  concerned  the  bureau  of  navigation,  whose  prin- 
cipal functions  were  the  administration  and  direction  of  the 
personnel,  which  was  also  an  administrative  bureau  of  the  de- 
partment. Congress  having  failed  to  provide  a department 
with  “command  duties,”  there  grew  up  the  custom  of  entrusting 
♦the  military  duties  of  the  navy  department  to  this  bureau,  “in 
addition  to  its  other  duties.”  By  law,  the  bureau  of  naviga- 
tion had  no  precedence  over  the  other  bureaus,  yet  it  acquired 
a priority  in  rank  by  reason  of  its  directive  duties.  But  the 
material  bureaus  that  supply  the  requirements  of  the  military 
branch  did  not  always  feel  obliged  to  conform  to  the  standards 
set  by  the  bureau  of  navigation,  and  the  bureau,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  so  deeply  involved  in  its  own  routine  of  personnel 
administration  that  it  sometimes  could  not  fully  appreciate  its 
“additional  duties”  of  preparing  the  navy  for  war. 

In  his  annual  report  for  1900,  Secretary  John  D.  Long  offered 
a plan  for  the  simplification  of  the  department’s  organization. 
This  referred  to  the  consolidation  of  the  material  bureaus  of 
construction  and  repair,  steam  engineering  and  equipment. 
“The  union  of  these  three  bureaus,  the  chief  function  of  which 
is  to  deal  with  the  material  of  the  ship,  into  one  bureau,  the 
consolidation  of  their  several  corps  of  assistants  and  inspectors, 


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and  the  conduct  of  the  really  integral  work  of  building  and 
equipping  vessels  under  the  management  of  one  responsible 
chief  instead  of  three  chiefs,  would  promote  the  efficient  and  eco- 
nomical administration  of  this  important  part  of  the  business  of 
the  navy  department/’  Nothing  could  be  done  without  the 
cooperation  of  congress,  however,  and  as  that  body  took  no 
action  upon  this  recommendation,  the  opportunity  of  securing 
harmony  by  consolidation  was  passed  over. 

In  the  meantime  Admiral  Taylor,  as  chief  of  the  bureau  of 
navigation,  was  continuing  his  efforts  to  secure  “an  efficient 
administration  of  the  fleet.”  In  his  annual  report  for  1902,  he 
dwelt  at  length  upon  this  all-important  subject.  The  efforts 
made  by  the  navy  since  1893  to  bring  about  a “larger  control 
and  a closer  responsibility,”  had  been  attended  with  partial  suc- 
cess. The  bureau  of  navigation,  the  general  board,  the  office  of 
naval  intelligence,  the  war  college,  and  the  board  of  inspection 
and  survey  had  been  drawn  steadily  closer  together  as  compo- 
nent parts  of  a general  staff.  All  this  had  been  accomplished 
without  legislative  assistance;  but  “we  can  go  no  further,”  he 
remarked,  “without  congressional  legislation,  which  shall  es- 
tablish a general  staff  with  the  control  necessary  to  administer 
more  effectively  the  affairs  of  the  fleet.  A complete  plan  is 
prepared,  which  will  require  only  legislative  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  a chief  of  a general  staff  and  the  several  sections 
necessary  to  carry  out  the  various  details.  Without  such  an 
organization,  the  power  to  establish  thorough  reforms  will  be 
lacking.” 

This  and  subsequent  recommendations  failed  to  bring  about 
the  desired  action  by  congress.  In  1909  the  President  appointed 
a board  to  consider  the  principles  which  should  form  the  foun- 
dation for  the  reorganization  of  the  department.  The  members 
of  this  board  were  ex-Secretaries  William  H.  Moody  and  Paul 
Morton,  rear  admirals  Stephen  B.  Luce  and  Alfred  T.  Mahan, 
and  Congressman  A.  G.  Dayton.  Their  report  was  so  plain  and 
so  eloquent  an  appeal  for  reform  that  the  very  soundness  of  its 
recommendations  should  have  convinced  the  stubborn  legisla- 
tors at  the  Capitol.  But  this,  unfortunately,  was  not  the  case. 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


67 


Congress  refused  to  heed  even  the  best  professional  advice,  and 
did  nothing. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  Secretary  Meyer,  after  he  came  to  the 
navy  department  in  1909,  was  to  appoint  the  Swift  board  to 
consider  the  means  of  properly  coordinating  the  work  of  the  in- 
terdependent bureaus.  “Advice  on  all  subjects  may  be  had 
for  the  asking,  or  even  without  asking,”  wrote  Mr.  Meyer  in  his 
annual  report  for  1909,  “but  as  a rule,  it  would  not  be  advice 
that  it  would  be  wise  to  follow.  Its  authors  are  not  responsible.” 
The  secretary  of  the  navy  was,  as  should  be  under  our  form 
of  government,  a civilian,  but,  being  a civilian,  he  lacked  expert 
knowledge  adequately  to  direct  all  the  varied  operations  of  the 
navy.  It  was  essential,  then,  that  he  should  be  provided  with 
assistants  in  the  different  lines  of  duties.  As  any  administrative 
legislation  by  congress  seemed  improbable,  the  Swift  board 
recommended  measures  which  could  be  put  into  effect  by  the 
secretary  alone.  The  business  administration  of  the  navy  de- 
partment logically  divided  itself  into  groups  under  personnel, 
material,  and  the  operations  or  management  of  the  fleet.  Per- 
sonnel included  the  bureaus  of  navigation,  medicine  and  sur- 
gery, and  the  marine  corps.  Material  covered  the  bureaus  of 
construction  and  repair,  ordnance,  equipment,  steam  engineer- 
ing, and  supplies  and  accounts.  Public  works  were  the  prov- 
ince of  the  bureau  of  yards  and  docks.  To  each  of  these  divi- 
sions was  detailed  an  officer  of  rank  on  the  active  list  whose  duty 
it  was  to  advise  the  secretary  on  the  matters  pertaining  to  his 
particular  division,  but  who  actually  had  no  “supervisory  or 
executive  power  or  authority.”  Paragraph  109  of  the  Navy 
Regulations  for  1913  read,  “To  assist  the  secretary  of  the  navy  in 
coordinating  and  carrying  on  the  work  of  the  four  divisions, 
there  shall  be  on  duty  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  four  officers 
of  the  navy  on  the  active  list,  not  below  the  grade  of  captain, 
to  be  known,  respectively,  as  the  aid  for  operations,  aid  for 
personnel,  aid  for  material,  and  aid  for  inspections.  The  four 
aids  shall  constitute  the  secretary’s  advisory  council,  which  shall 
meet  daily  to  consider  important  questions  arising  in  any  di- 
vision affecting  the  general  policies  of  the  department  with  a 


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THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


view  to  an  effective  coordination  of  the  work  of  the  four  divi- 
sions.’7 The  aid  for  operations  was  to  advise  the  secretary  as  to 
strategic  and  tactical  matters  in  conjunction  with  the  general 
board,  and  also  advise  regarding  the  movements  and  dispositions 
of  naval  vessels;  the  aid  for  personnel  was  to  advise  the  secre- 
tary on  matters  which  fell  under  the  bureau  of  navigation,  the 
bureau  of  medicine  and  surgery,  the  office  of  the  judge-advocate- 
general,  and  the  naval  examining  and  retiring  boards;  the  aid 
for  material  was  to  advise  the  secretary  generally  on  matters 
concerning  the  construction,  arming,  equipment,  and  supply  of 
naval  vessels,  and  the  management  of  the  navy  yards;  the  aid 
for  inspections  was  to  advise  on  all  inspections  ashore  and  afloat 
coming  under  the  board  of  inspection  and  survey  for  ships,  the 
board  of  inspection  for  shore  stations,  and  the  special  inspecting 
officers.  “It  must  be  distinctly  understood,”  wrote  Mr.  Meyer, 
“that  the  purposes  contemplated  for  the  aids  cannot  be  effected 
without  an  entirely  broad  view,  each  of  his  own  field  of  activity, 
and  without  any  participation  in  the  details  of  the  bureaus. 
The  aids  will  not  be  allowed  to  burden  themselves  with  the  de- 
tails, and  will  thus  be  free  to  discuss  policies  and  reforms  with 
the  secretary.”  This  was  as  it  should  be,  and  in  accordance 
with  the  suggestions  made  by  Admiral  Mahan  in  1903,  when  he 
emphasized  the  “two  points:  (1)  that  the  advisers,  one  or  a 
board,  should  be  wholly  clear  of  administrative  activity;  and 
(2)  that  he  or  they  be  advisers  only,  pure  and  simple,  with  no 
power  to  affect  the  individual  responsibility  of  the  decision. 
This  must  be  preserved,  under  whatever  method,  as  the  secre- 
tary’s privilege  as  well  as  his  obligation.” 

In  practice,  Secretary  Meyer’s  plan  of  naval  reorganization 
was  an  improvement  over  the  conditions  existing  when  he 
came  to  the  department.  It  placed  the  military  branch  in  par- 
tial direction  of  the  military  direction  of  the  navy,  and  brought 
about  an  improvement  of  the  departmental  routine,  due  to  the 
advice  of  the ‘aids,  which  was  “exceedingly  gratifying.”  The 
one  imperfection  of  the  plan  was  that  it  had  not  the  force  of  law. 
Under  any  new  secretary  that  organization  might  lapse  back  to 
the  basis  of  the  statute  where  the  civil  branch  was  given  full 


THE  DEPAKTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


69 


power  to  work  without  consulting  the  military  branch,  which, 
after  all,  was  alone  ultimately  responsible  for  the  successful 
prosecution  of  naval  campaigns. 

This  was  what  actually  happened  when  Secretary  Daniels 
succeeded  Mr.  Meyer  in  the  navy  department.  One  aid  after 
another  disappeared  from  the  secretary’s  council.  The  only 
addition  was  an  aid  for  education,  created  to  further  the  secre- 
tary’s ambition  to  familiarize  each  gun-pointer  and  coal-passer 
with  the  mysteries  of  the  English  language  and  the  problems  of 
elementary  mathematics. 

Then  came  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war,  with  naval 
operations  on  a scale  unheard  of  in  the  world’s  history.  Before 
the  superb  organization  of  the  British  navy,  which  at  the  outset 
checked  the  activities  of  the  high  sea  fleet  of  Germany,  the 
American  people  stood  aghast.  If  there  is  one  thing  the  Ameri- 
cans have  prided  themselves  upon  it  is  their  common  sense,  their 
practical  appreciation  of  the  adaptation  of  means  to  ends.  To 
the  administration  of  their  navy,  one  would  have  thought  that 
they  would  apply  some  of  the  principles  of  efficiency  which  they 
had  used  in  their  mastery  of  the  ancient  frontier  and  of  the  wil- 
derness and  the  western  deserts.  Yet,  to  the  surprise  of  thought- 
ful citizens,  their  sea  power,  the  all  important  factor  of  their 
national  defence,  they  permitted  to  develop  along  the  most 
“ haphazard  lines.”  The  lessons  of  the  immediate  present  were 
too  serious  to  be  entirely  neglected.  In  fact  so  serious  was 
the  warning  to  us  that  naval  officers  felt  emboldened  to  speak 
their  minds  more  freely  than  was  their  wont,  and  the  naval  com- 
mittees of  congress  in  their  hearing  learned  truths  which,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  they  would  have  preferred  to  silence. 
The  people  at  last  became  aroused.  Patriotic  societies  every- 
where lent  their  aid  to  organizing  public  opinion  which,  for  once, 
was  beginning  to  urge  what  it  should  have  demanded  of  its  rep- 
resentatives in  congress  years  before.  This  time  congress  was 
willing  to  listen.  By  the  first  week  in  January,  1915,  the  sub- 
committee of  the  house  committee  on  naval  affairs  reached  a 
decision  to  recommend  constructive  legislation  of  far-reaching 
importance  to  the  United  States  navy.  This  was  the  establish- 


70 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


ment  of  an  office  of  naval  operations  whose  sole  duty  was  to 
be  the  preparation  of  the  fleet  for  war. 

As  finally  approved,  the  act  of  March  3,  1915  left  much  to 
be  desired.  It  was,  however,  a step  in  the  right  direction,  and 
the  newly  appointed  chief  of  naval  operations  proceeded  at  once 
to  place  the  navy  on  a practical  war  basis.  Without  additional 
legislation,  the  office  took  steps  towards  organizing  the  industrial 
resources  of  the  country  behind  the  navy.  In  less  than  ten 
months  definite  plans  for  the  mobilization  of  the  entire  naval 
force  of  the  United  States  were  approved  and  placed  into  opera- 
tion so  as  to  bring  into  active  cooperation  all  the  various  bureaus 
and  elements  of  the  navy  department,  together  with  the  part  each 
naval  station  was  to  play  in  case  of  war.  All  the  vessels  of  the 
merchant  marine  were  inspected  and  their  particular  duties  in 
case  of  war  assigned.  An  immense  amount  of  detail  was  worked 
out  and  was  placed  on  file  ready  for  immediate  reference.  A 
definite  division  of  mining  and  mine  sweeping  was  put  into 
operation,  the  naval  districts  and  the  part  they  were  to  play 
were  definitely  organized,  the  radio  service  was  completely 
systematized.  All  these  duties  essential  to  the  proper  prepa- 
ration of  the  fleet  for  war  were  attended  to  by  the  new  office, 
which  the  administrative  bureaus  heretofore  had  been  unable 
and  incapable  of  transacting. 

Whatever  shortcomings  there  were  in  the  law  were  rectified 
in  the  naval  appropriation  bill  approved  on  August  29,  1916. 
The  chief  of  naval  operations  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  ad- 
miral ; to  assist  him  in  his  duties  were  no  less  than  fifteen  officers  of 
and  above  the  rank  of  lieutenant-commander  of  the  navy  or  major 
of  the  marine  corps.  He  was  “ charged  with  the  operations  of 
the  fleet,  and  with  the  preparation  and  readiness  of  plans  for 
its  use  in  war,”  and  during  the  temporary  absence  of  the  secre- 
tary and  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy  he  was  to  be  next  in 
succession  to  act  as  secretary  of  the  navy.  The  chief  of  opera- 
tions now  became  by  law,  as  well  as  in  name,  the  responsible  and 
coordinating  factor  in  the  affairs  of  the  department. 

After  this  somewhat  detailed  resume  of  the  development  and 
historical  antecedents  of  the  navy  department,  we  are  prepared 
to  deal  with  the  present. 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


71 


The  naval  administration  has  at  its  head  the  secretary  of  the 
navy,  a civilian,  who  is  the  personal  representative  of  the  Presi- 
dent. His  is  the  sole  control  and  the  single  responsibility.  He 
has  subordinates,  but  no  associates.  The  duty  of  decision  is, 
therefore,  his  alone. 

The  details  of  the  administrative  machinery  of  the  navy  are 
as  we  have  seen  of  two  principal  kinds:  those  that  concern  the 
operations  of  the  fleets,  in  peace  and  in  war,  which  is  the  mili- 
tary side  of  the  naval  administration;  and  those  that  relate  to 
the  creation  and  perservation  of  the  material  in  its  several 
varieties — ships,  guns,  engines,  etc. — which  is  the  civil  side. 
The  aggregation  of  duties  under  these  two  heads  being  too  great 
for  any  one  man  to  discharge,  they  have  been  again  subdivided  by 
law.  For  this  purpose  there  exist  side  by  side  the  two  phases 
of  the  system,  the  military  and  the  civil,  the  secretary  being  at 
the  head  of  each,  as  the  agent  of  the  President. 

To  assist  the  secretary  in  the  field  of  civil  administration, 
there  is  an  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy  (act  of  July  11,  1890), 
who,  in  the  temporary  absence  of  the  secretary,  is  next  in  suc- 
cession to  act  as  such. 

The  direction  of  activities  in  themselves  essentially  mili- 
tary— originally  delegated  to  the  board  of  navy  commissioners, 
but  vested  from  1842  to  1915  in  the  secretary  of  the  navy — is 
entrusted  to  the  chief  of  naval  operations  who  has  the  rank  of 
admiral,  and,  under  the  direction  of  the  secretary  of  the  navy, 
is  “ charged  with  the  operations  of  the  fleet  and  with  the  prepa- 
ration and  readiness  of  plans  for  its  use  in  war.”  In  the  tempo- 
rary absence  of  the  secretary  and  assistant  secretary  of  the 
navy,  he  is  the  next  in  succession  to  act  as  secretary  of  the 
navy,  but  the  orders  issued  by  him  have  at  all  times  full  force 
and  effect  as  emanating  from  the  secretary. 

In  practice,  the  scope  of  the  duties  embraced  by  the  office  of 
the  chief  of  naval  operations  includes  the  direction  of  all  strategic 
and  tactical  matters,  organization,  maneuvers,  target  practice, 
drills  and  exercises  and  the  training  of  the  fleet  for  war.  This 
includes  also  the  naval  war  college  at  Newport,  the  office  of 
naval  intelligence,  the  office  of  target  practice  and  engineering 


72 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


competitions,  the  operation  of  the  radio  service  and  other  sys- 
tems of  communication,  the  operations  of  the  aeronautics  ser- 
vice, the  division  of  mines  and  mining,  the  naval  defence  dis- 
tricts, the  naval  militia,  and  the  coast  guard  when  operating  with 
the  navy. 

Next  after  the  chief  of  operations  come  the  seven  bureaus2  of 
the  navy  department,  whose  duties  are  limited  in  application  to 
activities  subordinate  to  military  operations,  and  therefore  essen- 
tially civil  in  character.  They  are,  by  title,  as  follows:  Yards 
and  docks,  navigation,  ordnance,  construction  and  repair,  steam 
engineering,  supplies  and  accounts,  and  medicine  and  surgery. 
The  several  navy  yards,  and  the  designing,  building  and  mainte- 
nance of  their  dry  docks,  wharfs  and  building,  are  in  charge  of  the 
bureau  of  yards  and  docks,  the  chief  of  which  is  a civil  engineer. 
The  bureau  of  navigation  has,  “by  a historical  devolution/ ’ as 
Admiral  Mahan  pertinently  remarked,  “of  which  its  name  gives 
no  suggestion,  inherited  the  charge  of  the  personnel  of  the  navy, 
as  well  officers  as  enlisted  men.”  It  regulates  their  admission, 
supervises  their  training,  preserves  records  of  their  service,  and 
distributes  them  among  the  vessels  of  the  fleet.  In  addition  it 
is  charged  with  the  upkeep  and  operation  of  the  Naval  Academy 
and  of  the  naval  war  college.  Ordnance  is  a word  which  speaks 
for  itself;  this  includes  the  manufacture  of  guns,  torpedoes, 
mines  and  ammunition,  as  well  as  the  maintenance  of  the  naval 
gun  factory,  the  naval  proving  ground  and  powder  factory  and 
of  the  various  powder  depots  and  magazines  in  the  seaboard 
states.  The  bureau  of  construction  and  repair,  whose  personnel 
consists  of  naval  architects,  is  charged  with  all  that  relates  to  the 
building  and  maintenance  in  repair  of  the  hull  part  of  the  ships 
of  the  navy.  Steam  engineering  includes  the  designing,  build- 
ing, maintenance  and  repair  of  machinery  for  all  our  vessels. 
The  bureau  of  supplies  and  accounts  is  the  purchasing  agency 
of  the  service.  It  buys  for  other  bureaus,  subject  to  their 
requisition  and  inspection,  and  buys  and  supplies,  on  its  own 
account,  the  provisions,  clothing  and  supplies  required  for  the 

2 The  bureau  of  equipment  was  abolished  by  the  act  of  June  30,  1914,  and  its 
duties  distributed  among  the  other  bureaus. 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


73 


ships  in  commission.  It  keeps,  also,  the  pay  accounts  of  the 
officers  and  men,  and  pays  them  at  stated  times.  The  hygiene 
of  the  navy  is  in  charge  of  the  bureau  of  medicine  and  surgery, 
the  importance  of  which  may  be  gauged  by  considering  how  far 
a well  man  is  more  useful  than  an  invalid. 

In  addition  to  the  bureaus,  the  organization  of  the  navy  de- 
partment includes  the  judge  advocate  general  of  the  navy,  whose 
office  considers  and  reports  upon  all  legal  questions  relating  to 
the  personnel,  and  the  solicitor,  who  attends  to  the  other  ques- 
tions of  law,  such  as  the  drafting  and  interpretation  of  statutes, 
and  the  drawing  up  of  contracts. 

The  general  nature  of  the  functions  of  each  bureau  is  appar- 
ent. To  particularize  further  would  be  to  become  involved  in  a 
mass  of  technical  details.  The  important  fact  to  note  is  that 
each  bureau  has  a distinct  and  mutually  independent  duty. 

There  is  little  question  that  the  department  administration 
would  be  greatly  benefited  by  the  creation  of  an  office  of  inspec- 
tions, which,  constituted  independently  of  the  bureaus,  would 
supervise  the  work  done  by  the  bureaus  and  make  reports  on 
the  same  directly  to  the  secretary.  In  this  way  there  would  be 
provided  a check  upon  the  work  of  the  several  branches  of  the 
civil  administration  such  as  exists  in  every  modern  business  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  greater  efficiency  in  methods. 

Before  the  establishment  of  the  office  of  naval  operations, 
the  coordination  and  reconciliation  of  the  divergent  opinions 
inevitable  between  so  many  parties  depended  solely  upon  the 
secretary's  appreciation  of  the  necessities  of  the  navy — not  only 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  bureaus,  but  also  from  that  of  the 
fleet.  It  is  true  that,  in  matters  of  policy,  the  secretary,  since 
1900,  has  had  the  deliberations  and  reports  of  the  general  board 
to  guide  him,  but  that  body  being  purely  advisory,  its  recom- 
mendations have  on  many  occasions  been  disregarded  by  him. 

According  to  the  navy  regulations  the  various  chiefs  of  bu- 
reaus, and  the  assistant  secretary  of  the  navy,  the  chief  of  naval 
operations,  the  major  general  commandant  of  the  marine  corps 
and  the  judge  advocate  general  of  the  navy,  form  the  secretary 
of  the  navy's  advisory  council.  Meetings  are  held  every  week 


74 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


at  which  the  discussion  relates  to  the  various  important  matters 
of  detail.  Provision  is  also  made  for  conferences  between  the 
chief  of  naval  operations  and  the  various  bureaus  when  neces- 
sary to  facilitate  the  transaction  of  business. 

As  at  present  developed  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
the  organization  of  the  navy  department  has  reached  the  point 
where  it  may  attain  and  preserve  substantial  unity  of  executive 
action,  while  at  the  same  time  it  provides  for  the  distribution 
among  several  individuals  of  a mass  of  detailed  duties  beyond 
the  power  of  one  man  to  discharge. 

Admiral  Mahan  defined  the  test  of  a system  of  naval  ad- 
ministration as  “its  capacity — inherent,  not  spasmodic — to  keep 
the  establishment  of  the  navy  abreast  of  the  best  professional 
opinion  concerning  contemporary  necessities,  both  in  quality  and 
quantity.  It  needs  not  only  to  know  and  to  have  what  is  best 
today,  but  to  embody  an  organic  provision  for  watching  and 
forecasting  to  a reasonable  future  what  will  be  demanded.  This 
may  not  be  trusted  to  voluntary  action  or  to  individual  initia- 
tive. There  is  needed  a constituted  organ  to  receive,  digest, 
and  then  officially  to  state,  in  virtue  of  its  recognized  office,  what 
the  highest  instructed  professional  opinion  of  the  sea  officers 
holds  concerning  the  needs  of  the  navy  at  the  moment  and  for 
the  future  as  far  as  present  progress  indicates.”  For  forty  years, 
the  misconception  and  jealousy  of  our  politicians  prevented  the 
navy  from  gaining  the  organization  which  it  knew  it  must  have 
if  the  fleet  was  to  be  effective  in  war.  In  the  upbuilding  of 
the  new  navy,  the  public  mind  also  was  centered  too  much  on 
the  power  of  the  single  ship;  it  took  no  account  of  the  various 
accessories  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  the  fleet.  The 
greatest  war  of  all  time,  however,  has  taught  us  that  the  admin- 
istration of  a navy  consists  not  merely  in  building  ships,  in 
buying  material,  in  repairing  vessels,  in  enlisting  men,  in  man- 
ning ships,  or  in  developing  navy  yards  and  naval  stations; 
it  is  the  coordination  of  all  these  duties  and  their  welding  into 
an  effective  instrument  of  war.  The  responsibility  for  the 
efficiency  of  that  instrument  of  war  cannot  therefore  be  di- 
vided. Each  separate  activity  must  be  thoroughly  controlled 
and  made  to  cooperate  toward  the  ultimate  object  of  developing 


THE  DEPAKTMENT  OF  THE  NAVY 


75 


the  battle  of  efficiency  of  the  fleet.  The  acts  of  March  3,  1915, 
and  August  29,  1916,  which  established  the  office  of  naval  op- 
erations, have  paved  the  way  for  such  a coordination  in  the  de- 
partment through  the  creation  of  a constituted  military  organ, 
senior  to  the  existing  administrative  civil  bureaus,  and  respon- 
sible for  the  preparation  of  the  navy  for  war.  The  military 
branch  of  the  department  has  been  brought  to  the  fore.  But 
the  prerogatives  of  the  chiefs  of  the  several  civil  bureaus  granted 
by  the  act  of  August  31,  1842,  unfortunately  still  prevail.  While 
the  office  of  naval  operations  has  been  installed  in  its  proper 
place  in  the  department,  the  bureaus  have  not  yet  received 
proper  attention  from  our  legislators.  In  time  a more  effective 
coordination  may  be  brought  about  between  these  conflicting 
elements,  but  it  will  entail  much  effort  and  the  waiving  by  the 
bureaus  of  some  of  their  cherished  but  injudicious  executive 
powers. 

The  spirit  of  our  government  requires  that  a civilian  shall 
be  at  the  head  of  the  navy  department.  That  is  as  it  should 
be.  But  in  this  very  lack  of  permanent  tenure  by  the  secretary 
himself  lies  one  of  the  weaknesses  of  our  system.  As  Mr.  Meyer 
wrote  in  1909,  “in  the  past  seven  years  there  have  been  six 
secretaries  of  the  navy.”  How  can  a civilian,  lacking  expert 
knowledge,  under  those  circumstances  direct  all  the  varied  op- 
erations of  the  naval  service?  With  unlimited  time  a secretary 
could  acquire  that  personal  knowledge  of  details  and  acquaint- 
ance with  the  characteristics  of  his  subordinates  which  are 
essential  to  the  successful  administrator.  No  such  incumbency 
is  to  be  expected  under  our  system  of  government.  To  supply 
the  defect  inherent  in  temporary  tenure  and  periodical  change, 
there  has  been  created  in  our  naval  administration  the  office 
of  naval  operations  which  may  obtain  for  the  navy  a “tradition 
of  policy,” — “analogous  in  fact”  to  quote  Admiral  Mahan's 
words,  “to  the  principles  of  a political  party,  which  are  continu- 
ous in  tradition,  though  progressive  in  modification.  These 
run  side  by  side  with  the  policy  of  particular  administrations; 
not  affecting  their  constituted  powers,  but  guiding  general  lines 
of  action  by  influence,  the  benefit  of  which,  through  the  assur- 
ance of  continuity,  is  universally  admitted.” 


112  061965015 


